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Problem.
In this paper we test, but fail to confirm, a basic 
assumption underlying Bachrach and Baratz’s theory of 
nondecisions (1962; 1963; 1970).
Bachrach and Baratz's Power and Poverty (1970) was the 
culmination of a decade of theory and research on the 
implications of pre- and post-decision politics for 
redistributive agendas. This research was significant for four 
reasons: First, because it extended conceptions of the process 
by which public policy is formed both forwards (to 
implementation) and backwards (to the identification and 
specification of issues and the structure of agendas). Second, 
because the identification and specification of issues and the 
structure of agendas proved to be important determinants of what 
decisions are made about public policy. (See Tversky and 
Kahnman, 1974, on the effects of how issues are framed and Plott 
and Levine, 1978, on the effects of how agendas are structured.) 
Third, because it corrected distortions in the analysis of 
community and national power which were undeniable even if one 
was not a ruling-elite theorist. And fourth, because it 
suggested ways of filling two large gaps in the theory of 
collective decisions, one involving the less visible aspects of
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power, the other involving the more problematic aspects of 
legitimacy. (Although its determinants are the same, Bachrach 
and Baratz argued that agenda politics are less visible and more 
often involve contests over the legitimacy of actors, issues, and 
tactics than decisions do.)
Notwithstanding its significance, Bachrach and Baratz's 
theory nas had only a minimal impact in sociology; its much 
greater impact on political science has been largely at the 
expense of the questions about the politics of the suppression of 
issues that it originally asked; and the few political scientists 
who have remained faithful to its vision of the world have been 
largely mired in irreconcilable methodological conflicts. The 
"redistributive hypothesis" that is central to their theory has 
mostly been neglected.1
Their "redistributive hypothesis" is that the greater the 
likelihood that a policy will, if adopted, redistribute existing 
shares in status, power, or wealth, the less the likelihood that 
it is on a polity’s agenda. This is because in Bachrach and 
Baratz's theory those most threatened by such policies are those 
who control the agenda. The agenda is thought of as a gate, the 
"haves" as the gatekeepers, and the gate opens or shuts depending 
on the degree to which an issue challenges existing inequalities.
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Redistributive issues are aborted in predecision politics rather 
than decided openly because decisions are more influenced by 
elections and have-nots are in the majority. The capacity to 
abort issues before they are decided lies both in the authority 
of haves over agenda practices and their differential access to 
rule-making practices. Legitimacy is a basic mechanism of the 
process: ,,Have-nots," because they are excluded (by hypothesis) 
from the effective polity are not legitimate political actors, do 
not have legitimate means of access to the polity, and their 
issues are often either "private" or ,,subversive.1" Hence, it is 
usually sufficient to manipulate the existing rules to delay or 
prevent redistributive issues from being decided. But the 
,,haves" also have the capacity, if necessary, to make more rules. 
It is the combination of their rule-reinforcing, rule-invoking, 
and rule-making practices that aborts most redistributive issues 
before they are decided.
This "hypothesis" is obviously a complicated structure of 
ideas: It consists of (1) an empirical generalization about the 
frequency of redistributive agendas; (2) an explanation of this 
generalization, in terms of (a) the frequency of a particular set 
of initial conditions, the correlated bias of distributions of 
power, wealth, and status, and (b) a covering law, about the
determination of rule-reinforcing, rule-invoking, and rule-making 
practices by objective interests; and (3) an underlying 
theoretical strategy which divides the polity into two and only 
two antagonistic parts, each driven by rational self-interest to 
compete for finite resources and rewards.
Both the neglect of Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis and the 
irreconcilable conflicts in which it often gets mired are 
probably due to the third of these elements, the theoretical 
strategy that lies behind it. From a contemporary Marxist’s 
point of view, it is either commonplace or vulgar (because of its 
instrumentalism as well as its economism); in either case, not 
very interesting. From an anti-Marxist's point of view, it is 
naive; again, not very interesting. The combination of the two 
has led to the neglect of Bachrach and Baratz’s hypothesis except 
by its special partisans, who have been few, and to the isolation 
of these partisans from the mainstream of both sociological and 
political science research, without serious attempt to confront 
the empirical issues that lie at its heart. It is in fact often 
argued that it is impossible to confront these issues because the 
hypothesis is irremediably untestable. ”Nondecisions" are the 
undecided issues of a polity. There are an infinite number of 
things a polity does not decide, hence the need for some 
independent, observable, criterion of issueness. Bachrach and
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Baratz infer issueness from auxiliary hypotheses about objective 
interests: For example, that the have-nots challenge existing 
inequalities, whether observed to do so or not, because it is in 
their objective interest to do so. If no challenge is observed, 
therefore, it is because the issue has somehow been nondecided.
To identify nondecisions, therefore, one relies either on cui 
bono or on the (biased) values, beliefs, rules, practices and 
procedures of the polity. Hence, the large number of largely 
empty debates over testability. The obvious circularity of the 
method has been a principle bone of contention in these debates 
(which are summarized in Zelditch, et al, 1983, pp. 9-10).
But Bachrach and Baratz*s work is serious and deserves to be 
taken seriously. It is not enough to claim that vulgar Marxism 
is ipso facto bound to be false or that nondecisions are ipso 
facto unobservable. For one thing, an operational definition of 
a nondecision is possible providing a comparative method is 
possible: A ,,nondecision" is simply an issue, suppressed by 
factor X, that is on the agenda of an otherwise similar polity in 
which X is absent (McFarland, 1969). It is no more unobservable 
than Dahl’s definition of power (1957), to which it is formally 
equivalent. It is true, as Polsby insists, that the criterion is 
difficult to satisfy nonexperimentally (1980, Ch. 11). For
example, Crenson (1971) had found that the greater the 
concentration of ownership in a community’s industry, the less 
likely that air pollution was on its political agenda. He argued 
that power, through the law of anticipated reactions, had 
suppressed the issue. Polsby objected that Crenson had not 
controlled for the rival hypothesis that the greater the 
concentration of ownership in industry the more likely workers 
were to trade dirty air for jobs. But, in principle, the 
difficulties are no greater than in any other nonexperimental 
comparison. Possibly in fact, it is only because the 
redistributive hypothesis is so pregnant with larger, 
"paradigmatic" meaning that the standards of internal validity 
applied to tests of it suddenly became so rigorous.
The present paper cannot and does not test the larger 
theoretical strategy lying behind Bachrach and Baratz's 
hypothesis. No one investigation proves or disproves an entire 
way of thinking about sociology. But we do test the covering law 
they employ in explaining the legitimacy of redistributive 
agendas. Because of the kinds of objections that can 
legitimately be made to Crenson•s nonexperimental methods, we 
employ an experimental method that meets fairly rigorous 
standards of internal validity.2
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This method is unsuited to testing either the frequency with 
which redistributive agendas occur or the prevalence of 
correlated bias assumed by Bachrach and Baratz. Thus, in terms 
of the elements of their argument outlined in paragraph 5, the 
only part of the argument to which our experiment is relevant is
2.b. Elsewhere, we have tested a number of other hypotheses 
derived from Bachrach and Baratz, all having to do with the 
consequences of power or legitimacy for emergence of issues and 
all of which are supported, by the same experimental methods.3 
It should be emphasized that the present paper reports the only 
disconfirmation we have observed. It is, however, 
disconfirmation of the most important assumption of the theory.
The paper is divided into five parts. Because it is 
sometimes difficult to be exact about what Bachrach and Baratz 
mean to argue, we attempt a precise formulation of their 
hypothesis in part i. Part ii places tnis formulation in the 
context of tne larger, ,,paradigmatic," issues that lie behind it; 
it is tnese issues that give the experiment much of its larger 
significance. Part iii describes an experimental method of 
operationalizing the concepts of Bachrach and Baratz's theory and 
part iv the results of this experiment. In part v, finally, we 
discuss the significance of the fact that our results do not fit 
Bachrach and Baratz’s model.
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i• Bachrach and Baratz’s Theory.
Bachrach and Baratz's theory of ”nondecisions" is concerned 
with the issues that a polity has not decided to decide.
"Issues" are conflicts over preferences among alternative 
policies (including alternatives to existing states of society). 
Before they are decided they go through a complex process of 
identification, specification, and agenda setting. Such 
predecision stages of policy formation are critical to the shape 
and eventual fate of an issue. In Bachrach and Baratz’s theory, 
predecision politics are determined by the comparative state of 
mobilization of two (and only two) classes, A and B. Bachrach 
and Baratz characterize all actors by their location in a system 
of inequalities: A is the class of those who benefit from the 
existing system of inequalities, B those who do not.
The society of which A and B are the (only) two parts is 
characterized by the distribution of benefits and burdens among 
members, by the manner (mechanisms) in which such benefits are 
allocated, and by the values, beliefs, rules, practices and 
procedures that create and maintain these mechanisms. All 
benefits and burdens, all resources and rewards, are assumed to 
be unequally distributed, hence "biased" (the term is from 
Schattschneider, 1960). All kinds of bias are assumed to be
perfectly correlated. In particular, the polity of the society 
(authoritative procedures for making collective choices and 
members with access to them) is small and unrepresentative (hence 
also ,׳biased”) and its bia3 is perfectly correlated with 
inequalities in benefits and burdens. Thus, all members of the 
polity are A 1s and no B's are members.
Issues are characterized by Bachrach and Baratz in terms of 
their consequences for the existing system of bias. The sum of 
shares of status, power, or wealth is finite, hence a policy that 
would increase any share is redistributive, i.e., implies the 
decrease of someone else's status, power, or wealth. Any issue 
is redistributive if at least one of its possible policies is 
redistributive.
Both A and B are assumed to be rational, self-interested 
actors whose behavior an outside observer can predict from 
analysis of their objective interests, i.e., from analysis of the 
existing distributions of benefits and burdens (or the values, 
beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that create and maintain 
them).
The behavior of B is described in terms of challenges to the 
system of inequalities. (Absence of such challenge constitutes a 
nondeci3ion.) The factors that determine whether B challenges
־9־
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the existing system of inequalities are the amount of resources 
available to B. the extent of B's dependence on A, and the 
legitimacy of B's participation in the polity, of the tactics 
available to B, and of B's i33ue itself.
The principal behavior of A is the "mobilization of bias" 
(also from Schattschneider, 1960). The "mobilization of bias" 
refers to three kinds of behavior: reinforcing rules, invoking 
rules, and making, rules. Like all other features of a polity, 
rules are assumed to be biased, i.e., to benefit some members 
(A * 3) more than others (B's). Rules are in fact assumed to be 
pure instruments of power and it is purely power that makes them. 
Because "power" in this particular sense means membership in the 
polity, and it is in the interests of the polity's members that 
rules are made, the bias of the rules is again perfectly 
correlated with the bias of the system of inequalities. It is 
therefore always in A's objective interests to reinforce the 
existing values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures of 
society which create and maintain this system and "mobilization 
of bias" is in fact normal behavior of any ruling class. But 
when issues are redistributive, A in addition actively invokes 
rules that prevent the issue from being decided: These define B 
as an outsider, B's tactics as offensive, the issue as private or
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subversive. Because of A's differential access to the polity’s 
rule-making practices, A makes more such rules if the existing 
rules are not sufficient.
The purpose of the mobilization of bias is of course to mask 
A ’s (and B׳s) real interests. A's power is by itself sufficient 
to prevent a redistributive issue from emerging, but without the 
mystification of A’s and B's real interests induced by 
manipulation of legitimacy it is assumed that the existing system 
of inequalities is unstable.
The aggregate outcome of A's and B's behavior is a 
self-maintaining system of bias. (In this respect, Bachrach and 
Baratz’s theory is quite unMarxist; it has no dialectic.) At any 
stage of a rather complex predecision process an issue can be 
either suppressed or else reshaped in a way that makes it more 
safe (i.e., less redistributive). The outcome is determined by 
the amount of pressure for change induced in B by the amount of 
inequality, the amount of power and amount of mobilization of 
bias by A, and the magnitude of the effects of A ’s power and 
mobilization of bias on B's attempts to challenge inequality.
The present paper is especially concerned with the behavior of 
A. We believe that Bachrach ana Baratz’s theory of this behavior 
can be summarized by the following model:
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Where A  = the magnitude of A's attempts to nondecide some issue, 
¿= tiie magnitude of A’s vested interest in an existing 
system of inequalities,
A =  the existence of a value, rule, belief, practice or
procedure that delegitimates B, B's tactics, or B's 
issue.
This model is a compact way of expressing three hypotheses:
(1) a main effect of "objective interests" on A's attempts to 
delay or prevent decisions about a redistributive issue; (2) the 
absence of a main effect of legitimation, i.e., the hypothesis 
that legitimacy by itself does not determine the process but only 
when combined with an objective interest; and (3) an interaction 
effect of interest and legitimacy combined, i.e., the existence 
of a vested interest determines the effect of legitimacy while 
legitimacy magnifies the effect of an interest.2* These three 
hypotheses are a more precise (hence more testable) expression of 
what in paragraph 5 was a single idea (the determination of rule 
reinforcing, invoking, and making by objective interests). They 
are linked to the redistributive hypothesis by the fact that U, 
increases as a function of the redistributive potential of a 
policy. (This assumption is not itself tested by the present
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paper because we experimentally manipulate it as an initially 
given condition.)
ii. The Theoretical Strategy Behind Bachrach and Baratz’s
Hypothesis.
The confirmation or disconfirmation of Bachrach and Baratz's 
redistributive hypothesis assumes a larger significance in part 
because of broader issues of theoretical strategy that lie behind 
it. The model described in the previous section is a more 
precise and testable way of formulating a general strategy that 
reduces legitimacy, and the ideas tnat give rise to it, to a 
purely material base.
The theoretical strategy that guides the construction of 
Bachrach and Baratz's theory assumes (1) that all action is 
determined by objective material interests (economism); (2) that 
there is a need to mask real interests when explaining and 
justifying actions, i.e., a need to legitimate them (masking);
(3) that rational, self-interested individuals manipulate myths, 
ideas, and rules instrumentally in order to accomplish this 
(instrumentalism); and (*1) that the ruling ideas are those of the 
ruling class (domination). Implied in these four assumptions are 
(5) that the rules thus made are arbitrary^; (6) that they bind B
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but not A; and (7) that A is more conscious of, or if not more 
conscious at least more moved by. his real interests than B.
This strategy will be recognizable to most readers as a form 
of second-international ("scientific") Marxism, systematized in 
Plekhanov’s manuals for the faithful, and after him in 
Bukharin’s, and after Bukharin, in Stalin's Short Course.
Bachrach and Baratz's theory is a kind of instrumental Marxism 
without the dialectic.
Not only anti-Marxists, but even most post-war Marxists have 
already rejected this kind of instrumental Marxism. At the time 
the present experiment was planned we had not prejudged its 
outcome, but, having failed to confirm the hypothesis, proceeding 
to publish the results may seem like beating an already dead 
horse. But Plekhanov is far from dead. His directives guide the 
construction of most ruling class theories of power (for example, 
Domhoff, 1983 and Hunter, 1980); many conflict theories of 
deviance (for example, Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, though not 
the second edition, 1982, or Platt, especially the 3econd 
edition, 1977, or Quinney, 1970); and even some non-Marxist, 
syncretic theories (such as Lenski's theory of inequality, 1966, 
especially Chs. 2-3). All these theories not only grow from 
Plekhanov׳s basic assumptions about the nature of man and
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society , they typically also incorporate some variant of Bachrach 
and Baratz's specific nypotheses about how A behaves.
Of course, one test of Bachrach and Baratz's theory neither 
proves nor disproves Plekhanov. Assumptions like economism are 
in themselves untestable. If disconfirmed in any particular 
instance, they can still be held to be true in the last instance 
or of larger scale processes of change. They are really 
prescriptions for how to formulate problems and solutions, not 
empirical claims. They acquire empirical import in particular 
specifications, like Domhoff’s, Chambliss's, or Lenski’s. But 
again, although a test of a particular specification confirms or 
disconfirms it, this neither proves nor disproves an entire 
theoretical strategy because each particular theory specifies and 
operationalizes the relevant hypotheses in different ways.
Disconfirmation of Bachrach and Baratz’s redistributive 
hypothesis does not disconfirm Domhoff’s, Chambliss’s, or 
Lenski’s. In any case, the criteria by which particular theories 
are assessed are themselves strategy-dependent and few strategies 
are self-refuting; while rejection by criteria alien to the 
strategy may be irrelevant, at least to its adherents.
But we are not trying to convert adherents, we are only 
trying to understand the phenomenon of legitimation. We do not
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claim that there are criteria outside all theoretical strategies 
making neutral assessment possible; we simply employ unashamedly 
mainstream positivistic criteria that we ourselves believe in.
Nor do we claim that one test is sufficient to confirm or refute 
a whole way of thinking about society. What is required is a 
substantial accumulation of results; the present study is only 
one straw on the camel's back. Finally, if strategies are not 
testable, it is nevertheless possible to ask if they are useful; 
and, if not, in what ways they are not useful. In this sense, a 
test of Bachrach and Baratz’s redistributive hypothesis has a 
somewhat larger significance even if one is not interested in 
nondecisionmaking.
iii. Method.
One hundred twenty-two male undergraduates were recruited to 
serve as paid volunteers in an experiment. When recruited, 
participants were told that they could expect to earn, on the 
average, approximately $6.50 for participating in a study of 
communication networks. Data collected on thirty-nine subjects 
who were suspicious or who otherwise violated the conditions of 
the experiment^ have not been included in the analysis.
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Basic Experimental Setting.
The setting consisted of a set of rooms, each equipped with 
a desk, chair, television monitor, signalling device, and a 
variety of message slips. When subjects arrived at the 
laboratory, they were asked to draw a colored token from a can, 
under the pretense that they were to be randomly assigned to one 
of six rooms, each corresponding to a different token (in 
reality, the can contained only ,,office'* tokens). Each 
participant was then seated in a room labeled ,,Office.״׳
Subjects received videotaped instructions which indicated 
that they were members of a six-person group which would work a 
series of two practice problems and ten criterion problems. Five 
members of the group would work on the actual problem-solving 
task, while the sixth member, the office, would be responsible 
for collecting the answers and tabulating team earnings. The 
office was asked to pay attention to the instructions to the 
problem-solving members before he received his own instructions.
,,Office" heard the "problem-solving members" being told that 
each problem required the construction of a five-point, 
multi-line graph. Each team member except office was initially 
given some of the information required to solve the problem, but 
no member was given all of this information. Completion of a
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problem required that each participant collect the information 
given to the other four members, from that information construct 
the graph, and then send the completed graph to the office. When 
the office received all five answers, he would send each member a 
message which indicated that the problem had been completed.
After a brief rest period, the office would then send each member 
a message informing them of the team earnings on the completed 
problem and instructing them to begin the next problem.
Office participants were led to believe that the other 
participants had been assigned to a highly centralized ,,wheel” 
structure (Bavelas, 1950) which consisted of a central position, 
four peripheral positions (all of which were simulated by 
confederates), and four open channels, one of which connected 
each of the peripheral positions to the central position. Each 
peripheral position could communicate directly only with the 
center and the office. Furthermore, they could send only answers 
and rental requests to the office. All communication was 
restricted to written messages which were to be picked up and 
delivered by messengers. This network was presented graphically 
to the office, as well as being described in the instructions and 
in a printed list of open and closed channels.
The study was presented as an investigation of communication
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patterns in groups whose members could communicate only by 
limited written messages. it was made clear that cooperation was 
necessary for any member of tne group to correctly solve the 
problem. For this reason, all earnings were to be awarded to the 
problem-solving group as a group. Each member was to submit an 
answer and the group would receive $.25 for each correct answer 
submitted on each criterion trial. The group earnings would then 
be divided equally among the members at the end of the study. In 
this manner, the equal distribution of rewards was established as 
equitable. Tne office was to be paid a flat fee of $6.50 apart 
from team earnings, since he did not participate in the actual 
problem-solving task.
Subjects were instructed that the communication structure 
could be changed by renting additional communication channels at 
a cost to the team of five cents per channel for each trial 
during which the channel was being rented. Channels could also 
be closed at no additional cost. All ”participants" were 
provided with a list of open and closed communication channels, 
and any problem-solving member could initiate specific network 
changes by filling in a rental request form, specifying which 
channels were to be opened and/or closed, illustrating the 
proposed change by drawing in the arrows on a diagram of the
Nnetwork, and sending the request to the office during a rest 
period. If office endorsed the proposal, an election would be 
held and the proposed change would be implemented if a majority 
of the problem-solving members approved. Rented channels would 
remain open until they were specifically closed through the same 
procedure.
Office was instructed that he would be responsible for 
deciding whether to let the group vote on the proposed change.
If he approved the proposal, he was to endorse the request and 
forward it to the experimental staff, which would conduct the 
election and inform the office of the results. If he did not 
approve the proposed change, he simply put the request aside and 
continued with the normal procedures of the task. Thus, the 
office was given the power to determine the group’s political 
agenda.
The procedures of the experiment of course provided the 
experimenter with complete control of all messages sent to all 
participants. In all conditions of the experiment, a confederate 
of the experimenter’s sent a rental request to the office at the 
end of the third criterion trial. The experiment ended 
immediately after the subjects either did or did not endorse a 
proposed change. Upon termination, the subject was askea to fill
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out a questionnaire. He was then interviewed. All the 
deceptions of the experiment were then fully explained and the 
subject was paid for his participation.
Baseline Pressures to Change in the Control Condition of 
the Experiment.
After two practice problems, participants were given a short 
questionnaire to complete. After the questionnaires were 
returned and before the start of the ten criterion problems, the 
host reappeared on the monitor and indicated that although the 
team had done well on the practice problems, it was thought that 
members could work faster. To encourage individual 
problem-solving members to work more quickly, a bonus of $1.25 
would be awarded for each problem to the individual submitting 
the first correct solution. The bonus was to be awarded 
independently of team earnings and could not be divided. The 
office was to inform the problem-solving members which one had 
won the bonus on a given problem at the end of each rest period, 
along with notification of team earnings.
The effect of adding the bonus was to create a substantial 
inequity in the allocation of rewards to the group. In a 
centralized network, the center would always receive all the 
necessary information first. Other participants could not win
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the bonus unless the network was changed or the rules violated.
The control condition of the experiment was designed to 
provide a baseline measure of the pressure on office to respond 
positively to proposals to change the structure of the 
communications network. Office was paid a flat fee of $6.50 
regardless of team or individual performance. Office's earnings 
were uncorrelatea with team earnings and ne could not win the 
bonus. The peripheral positions in the wheel faced an obvious 
inequity. Office had no vested interest in maintaining the 
existing structure. In Bachrach and Baratz's terms, change was a 
"safe" issue; there should be no resistance to change.
Therefore, office should endorse a comparatively high proportion 
of change-oriented agendas.
Objective Interests in Maintaining the Existing Structure.
In a second condition of the experiment, the office was 
given a material interest in maintaining the inequitable wheel 
structure by instructing him that, because the bonus complicated 
matters, he would be paid as much as the highest paid 
problem-solving participant. If no member of the team earned 
more than $6.50, office would be guaranteed the normal flat fee. 
But if any member of the team earned more, he would receive the 
same amount as the participant who earned the most. The
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combination of this method of paying office with the structural 
advantages of the center position provided office with an 
economic incentive to suppress the issue of change.7
In this condition of the experiment, change is a 
"redistributive" issue in Bachrach and Baratz's sense and 
subjects should attempt to prevent or delay the emergence of such 
issues. Bachrach and Baratz's model thus predicts that subjects 
in the interest condition will reject a significantly higher 
proportion of change-oriented agendas than in the control 
condition.
Tne Legitimacy of Maintaining the Existing Structure.
In a third condition of the experiment, change was made 
illegitimate by making it appear to damage the objectives of the 
experiment. Office heard the experimenter instruct the 
problem-solving participants in the purpose of the experiment 
after the first practice problem. The purpose of the experiment 
was said to require reliable measurement of detailed patterns of 
information flow. Detailed patterns of information flow, 
according to the experimenter, did not become stable until after 
the eighth (criterion) trial of the experiment. All this was 
made part of an elaborate history of previous research, described 
both verbally and by a summary chart over everyone's desk
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(including office’s). Summarizing his instructions, the 
experimenter told the problem-solving participants that:
What we want to study is the detailed pattern of 
information flow in restricted communication systems. On 
the eighth problem we will measure the detailed pattern of 
information flow. To successfully measure this pattern, we 
need you to continue with the same restricted communication 
system for at least eight problems after you complete tne 
two practice problems.
Thus, maintenance of the wheel structure was made a 
necessary condition of the successful completion of the 
experiment. A change would, in a sense, render the experiment 
meaningless. It would violate the rules that constituted doing 
the experiment. Earlier research (reported in Thomas, et al, 
1984) had found that few problem-solving participants would 
attempt a change under this condition. The question for the 
present experiment was whether or not office would, under this 
condition, veto or endorse change-responses by problem-solving 
participants if they aid make tnem.
When the bonus was introduced at the end of the second 
practice problem, office was instructed that he would receive a 
flat fee of $6.50 for his participation, regardless of team or 
individual performance. Thus, in the third condition of the 
experiment subjects were personally disinterested in the existing
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structure.
Because there is no main effect of legitimacy in Bachrach 
and Baratz's model, it predicts for this condition of the 
experiment that the experimenter's instruction to the 
problem-solving participants should have no effect on 
agenda-gatekeeping. Office should therefore endorse the same 
proportion of change-oriented agendas as in the control 
condition.
The Interaction of Legitimacy and Interest.
In a fourth condition of the experiment, the legitimacy of 
the wheel structure was again established by defining its 
continued use as constitutive of the experiment. However, when 
the bonus was introduced office was told that because of the 
complications of the bonus he would be paid as much as the 
highest-paid member of the problem-solving team, again providing 
office with a material incentive for maintaining the inequitable 
structure.
This condition allows comparison of the interaction of 
interest and legitimacy with the independent effect of interest. 
It is an important condition for evaluating Bachrach and Baratz's 
model, which implies that legitimacy will have no effect apart 
from interest but, when combined with interest will magnify its 
ef f ec t.
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îv. Results.
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Table 1 shows the distribution of subject responses to the 
rental request by the presence or absence of the legitimacy and 
interest manipulations. As Table 1 demonstrates, virtually none 
of the subjects in the control (baseline) condition vetoed the 
rental request. The percentage of subjects vetoing the request 
increased in each of the subsequent conditions, with the highest 
percentage of vetoes appearing in the interaction condition.
Table 1. Effects of Interest and Legitimacy on the Log-Odds of Vetoing vs 
Endorsing Proposed Changes in Communication Structure Estimated for Bachrach 
and Baratz’s Nested Effects Model.
Condition N
Percent
Vetoing
Statistics of the Logit Analysis
Effect Parameter Chi Square df Probability
Baseline 20 5 i Constant -0.29 0.75 1 .39
Interest 20 Ü0% Interest 0.96 8.00 1 .005
Legitimacy 23 61% Legitimacy(1=1) 1.07 7.63 1 .006
Interaction 20 85% Legitimacy ( I=~t) 1.69 9.28 1 .002
A logit analysis was conducted to assess the relative 
effects of interest and legitimacy on the behavioral responses of 
the subjects. Logit analysis is roughly analogous to linear 
regression with a dichotomous dependent variable (see Feinberg 
1977, however, for a discussion of the limitations of this
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analogy). Logit analysis is especially suited to the analysis of 
experimental data, in which response variables and design 
(explanatory) variables are clearly distinguished, and in which 
design variables are manipulated by the experimenter.
The equation underlying a complete, or fully saturated, 
logit model for our data would be:
!"[Pij/d-Pij)] ^  +p2i ^ 3 L * P*1L’ (2)
where CP¿j/(1 —P¿j)3 is the odds of vetoing rather than endorsing 
the rental request; ^  !s the regression constant; is the main 
effect of objective interest; ^  !s the main effect of 
legitimacy; ^  !s the effect of the interaction between interest 
and legitimacy; I is the value of the interest variable and L is 
the value of the legitimacy variable as defined above; and IL is 
the interaction term, interest multiplied by legitimacy.
The saturated logit model always yields perfect predictions 
but is generally unsatisfactory because of its lack of parsimony. 
The choice of an appropriate model thus involves locating the 
model which gives the best fit to the data using the fewest 
number of parameters. The choice between alternative 
specifications of the model is made on the basis of a comparison 
of Likelihood Ratio statistics (G^) for goodness of fit.
We employed a maximum likelihood (ML) logit procedure (PROC
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FUNCAT, outlined in SAS Institute, 1982) to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Logit coefficients are interpretable in 
much the same way as regression coefficients. They represent the 
effects of the independent variables on the log-odds (or logit) 
of vetoing rather than endorsing the rental request. Effects on 
the log-odds, however, do not tell us very much of substantive 
interest and logit coefficients must be further transformed if 
one is to draw meaningful substantive interpretations from the 
analysis. Swafford (1980:672) has shown that logit equations can 
be transformed into multiplicative equations that express the 
results in terms of odds rather than in terras of the less 
tractable logits. For our data, the estimated multiplicative 
effect of a given independent variable on the odds of vetoing 
rather than endorsing the rental request, holding all other 
variables constant, can be obtained by the formula e 0 ־ (the 
exponential function), where $  is the estimated logit coefficient 
for the variable in question.8
To test Bachrach and Baratz’s model of A’s behavior, we 
estimated a nested effects logit model of the log-odds of vetoing 
rather than endorsing the rental request. (A "nested effects" 
model is a model in which one or more independent variables has 
no main effect but does interact with other independent variables
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in determining the dependent variable.) In the nested effects 
model, we estimated a main effect of objective interest and a 
separate effect of legitimacy for each value of the interest 
variable. Equation (3), which represents this model, is an 
operationalization of equation (1 ):
1« EPij/(1-Pij)3 + $■¿1 ♦ ^ 3[L:I4§/+ 13־tL:I3) ,13 ־ ־ )
where again Cp^j/(1—p^j) 3 is the odds of vetoing rather than 
endorsing the rental request, !s the regression constant,^ 
is the main effect of objective interest, and ^  is the effect of 
legitimacy when an objective interest is present [1*13 while 0  ^
is the effect of legitimacy when objective interest is absent 
[Is-I]. Nested effects models are especially appropriate for 
cases such as this, in which the effect of one of the independent 
variables is hypothesized to depend on the value of another 
independent variable. Our interpretation of Bachrach and 
Baratz's model leads us to expect the following results: (1) a 
main effect of interest on A's attempts to suppress 
redistributive change; (2 ) the absence of a main effect of 
legitimacy in the absence of interest; and (3 ) a reinforcing, 
i.e., an amplifying, effect of legitimacy in the presence of 
interest. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 1.
Table 2: Effects of Interest and Legitimacy on the Log-Odds of Vetoing vs. Endorsing Proposed 
Changes in Communication Structure Estimated for Alternatives to Bachrach and Baratz’s Model.
Model
Additive3
Additive with 
Interaction“ Nested Effects IIe
Independent Variables
logit std. 
coeff. error
logit std. 
coeff. error
logit std. 
coeff. error
Constant
Interest
Legitimacy
Interest x Legitimacy 
Interest (Legit=1) 
Interest (Legit= -1)
-0.13 0.27 
0.88*» 0.31 
1.32*** 0.31
-0.29 0.34 
0.96** 0.34 
1.38*** 0.34 
-0.31 0.34
-0.29 0.34
1.38*** 0.34
0.65+ 0.38 
1.27* 0.56
Likelihood Ratio 0.92 / 1 d.f. 0 / 0  d.f. 0 / 0  d.f.
p  ^ •10•
* p < .05 
** p < .01
*** p < 001־ a * aa. The model is 1n [p ./(-!-p..)] =>*, ♦ ־*¿I + ” !L. ״
b. The model is 1n [ p ^ / ( l-Pji) ] = -£i +'^2I + 'P?L + M (I x L)*
c. The model is 1n [ y  ( i-Pi j ^  1 + S0 2L + 1} L = -1].
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Our results do not generally support Bachrach and Baratz’s 
model. The nested effects model provides a perfect fit to the 
data, since it too is a saturated model, but the results show an 
interference effect of legitimacy rather than a reinforcing 
effect. We found a significant positive effect of interest on 
the odds of vetoing rental requests and significant positive 
effects of legitimacy in both the presence and absence of 
interest. Furthermore, the effect of legitimacy is much stronger 
in the absence of interest than in its presence. The odds of 
vetoing rental requests were 6.8 times greater when interest was 
present than when interest was absent. In the presence of 
interest, the odds of vetoing rental requests were 8.5 times 
greater in the presence of legitimacy than in its absence, while 
in the absence of interest, the odds of vetoing rental requests 
were 29.4 times greater when legitimacy was present than when it 
is absent. Thus, in contrast to Bachrach and Baratz's 
hypothesis, we found a very strong main effect of legitimacy in 
the absence of interest and a much smaller than predicted effect 
of legitimacy in the presence of interest.
Table X shows the results for three alternative 
specifications of the model: a purely additive (main effects) 
model; a model with both additive main effects and a reinforcing
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interaction term; and a nested effects model with a separate 
effect of interest for each level of legitimacy. As Table 2 
demonstrates, the simple main effects model provides a good fit 
to the data (G^ = 0.92 with 1 d.f., P = .34), with strong 
positive effects of both interest and legitimacy on the odds of 
vetoing rental requests. Because the legitimacy effect is 
significant this model also is inconsistent with Bachrach and 
Baratz. The additive model with a positive interaction 
represents a less instrumentalist model of A*s behavior than 
Bachrach and Baratz’s, one consistent with some alternative 
materialist theories of legitimacy, in which, once legitimacy 
exists, it does constrain even elites. Thi3 model shows 
significant positive effects of both interest and legitimacy on 
the odds of vetoing rather than endorsing rental requests, and an 
insignificant but negative rather than positive effect of the 
interaction. We cannot conclusively rule this model out, 
however, because there is a ceiling limiting the magnitude of the 
interaction effect. Every single subject in the interaction 
condition would have to veto rental requests to produce a 
significant interaction term.9 To properly assess this model we 
would have had to repeat the experiment with weaker interest and 
legitimacy effects, allowing more subjects to change in the
interaction condition. We did not attempt this because the 
evidence of both the behavioral and post-session questionnaire 
data (see below) consistently favored an interference rather than 
reinforcement effect.
The alternative nested effects model, with a main effect of 
legitimacy and a separate effect of interest for each value of 
legitimacy, further reinforces our conclusion that there is an 
interference rather than a reinforcement interaction between 
interest and legitimacy. This model, which again provides a 
perfect fit to the data because it is a saturated model, not only 
shows a much stronger effect of legitimacy than the effect of 
interest in the earlier nested effects model, but also produces a 
larger difference between the effects of interest in the presence 
and absence of legitimacy. In fact, the coefficient for interest 
in the presence of legitimacy is short of statistical 
significance at the .05 level. According to the results for this 
model, the odds of vetoing rental requests are 15.8 times greater 
when legitimacy is manipulated than when it is not manipulated, 
holding interest constant. In the absence of legitimacy, the 
odds of vetoing rental requests are 12.7 times greater when 
interest is present than when it is absent, while in the presence 
of legitimacy, the odds of vetoing are only 3.7 times greater.
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Thus, we find very little support for a reinforcing effect of 
interest ana legitimacy, and some evidence, instead, of an 
interference effect. That is, when legitimacy combines with 
interest the proportion of subjects who veto change-oriented 
agendas increases: But estimates of the coefficients of both 
nested interaction models show that this increase is less than 
Bachrach and Baratz’s model predicts, that in fact the effect of 
legitimacy is greater when interest is absent than when it is 
present.
To further evaluate Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis, we 
conducted logit analyses for five of the questions from a 
questionnaire administered at the end of the experimental 
session: the subject’s approval of the communication network; 
the subject’s opinion of the other team members’ approval of the 
network; the subject's opinion of the amount of the bonus; the 
subject’s opinion of the appropriateness of awarding a bonus to 
the team member who submits the first correct answer; and the 
subject’s opinion of how appropriate the other team members would 
feel it is to award a bonus. Responses to these questions can be 
thought of in part as justifications of, or accounts for, 
subjects’ behavioral responses to the conditions of the 
experiment. (The full test of the questions appears in the
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appendix . )
Originally coded on a five-point scale, responses to these 
questions were collapsed to form dichotoraous variables for the 
purposes of the analysis.1° Table 3 shows the distribution of 
responses to these questions by the presence or absence of the 
interest and legitimacy manipulations.
Table 3: Percent Positive on Selected Post-Experiment Questionnaire Items3, by Presence 
or Absence of Interest and Legitimacy (N in parentheses).
Legitimacy
No Yes
Interest Interest
Dependent Variable No Yes No Yes
Subject's Approval of Communication Network 
Others' Approval of Communication Network0 . 
Opinion of the Amount of the Bonu3 Payment0 
Appropriateness of Awarding a Bonus®
Others’ Opinion of Awarding a Bonus
40$(20) 
10$(20) 
40$(20) 
30$(20) 
5%(20)
65$(20) 
35$(20) 
70$(20) 
65$(20) 
40$(20)
61$(23) 
39$(23) 
26$(23) 
35$(23) 
35$(23)
70$(20) 
20$(20) 
55$(20) 
45$(20) 
40$(20)
a. See appendix for full text of questions.
b. Responses of "nighly approve1' and "slightly approve" were coded as 1 , 
while responses of "neither approve nor disapprove," "slightly disapprove," 
and "highly disapprove" were coded as -1.
c. Responses of "highly approve," "slightly approve," and "neither approve 
nor disapprove" were coded as 1, while responses of "slightly disapprove" 
and "highly disapprove" were coded as -1.
d. Responses of "much too low," "too low," and "about right" were coded as 1, 
while responses of "too high" and "much too high" were coded as -1.
e. Responses of "very appropriate," "somewhat appropriate," and "not 
appropriate or inappropriate" were coded as 1, while responses of "somewhat 
inappropriate" and "very inappropriate" were coded as -1.
f. Responses of "very appropriate," "somewhat appropriate," and "not appropriate
or inappropriate" were coded as 1, while responses of "somewhat inappropriate" and 
very inappropriate" were coded as -1.
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To evaluate Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis, we again 
estimated a nested effects logit model for each question, with a 
main effect of objective interest and a separate effect of 
legitimacy for each value of interest. The results of the 
analyses are reported in Table 4. We do not report likelihood 
ratio statistics for goodness of fit in this table, since the 
nested effects model estimated here is a saturated model, and 
thus, yields a perfect fit to the data. For each of these 
questions, Bachrach and Baratz's model leads us to expect a 
strong main effect of interest, no effect of legitimacy in the 
absence of interest, and a reinforcing effect of legitimacy in 
the presence of interest.
Table 4. Nested Effects Logit Analyses of Post-Session Questionnaire Items (N=83)a
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variable
Approval
ication
oil Commu- 
Networkb
Others' Approval 
of Network®
Opinion of 
Amount of Bonus*3
Appropriateness of 
Awarding Bonus״
Others' Opinion 
of Awarding Bonus^
logit 
coef f
std. 
error
logit std. 
coeff. error
logit std. 
coeff. error
logit
coeff
std. 
error
logit std. 
coeff. error
Constant 0.38 0.23 -1.16»** 0.28 -0 . 1 0 0 . 2 3 -0.26 0.23 - 1 .10*** 0 . 3 2
Interest O .36 0.23 0.16 0.28 0.62** 0.23 0.47* 0.23 0.69* 0.32
Legitimacy(Int= 1) 0.11 O .34 -0.38 0.36 -O .32 0.33 -0.41 O .32 0 0 . 3 2
Legitimacy(Int =-1) 0.42 0.31 0.88* 0.43 -O . 32 0.33 0.11 0.33 1.16* 0.56
* p < .05•
** p < .01.
**״ P < *001' fl » *a. The model is lntp¿j/( 1-p¿j) ] + Tr2I + ▼ 3d! I13-*־.
b. See notes to Table 3 for full text of questions.
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The post-session questionnaire results are more consistent 
with Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis than the behavioral results 
in the sense that interest has a main effect in three of the five 
questions while in no case is there an independent legitimacy 
effect. But in two of the five questions there is a significant 
interaction in which legitimacy interferes with, rather than 
reinforces, interest and even where the interactions are not 
significant the same pattern repeats in all five cases. In all 
five, the parameter for interest and legitimacy combined is less 
than the parameter for interest alone and in four of the five, 
the parameter for legitimacy and interest combined is less than 
the parameter for the effect of legitimacy in the absence of 
interest.11
Attitudes toward the bonus provide the strongest support for 
Bachrach and Baratz's model. We found strong main effects of 
objective interest on the subject’s attitude to both the amount 
of the bonus and the appropriateness of awarding it. The odds of 
expressing the opinion that the bonus was too low or about right 
were 3.5 times greater when interest was present than when it was 
absent. The odds of believing that awarding a bonus was not 
inappropriate were 2.6 times greater in the presence of interest 
than in its absence. We found no significant effect of
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legitimacy, under either condition of interest, on the subject's 
opinion toward either the amount of the bonus or the 
appropriateness of awarding the bonus. In fact, in the case of 
both variables, a simple model with only a main effect of 
objective interest provides a very good fit to the data with 
fewer parameters (For the subject's opinion of the amount of the 
bonus, G2 = 1.91 with 2 d.f., P = .39; for the subject's opinion 
of the appropriateness of awarding a bonus, G2 = 1.74 with 2
d.f., P = .42).
We also found a strong positive effect of interest on the 
subject's evaluation of the other team members' attitude toward 
the appropriateness of awarding the bonus, but in this case we 
found a significant negative interaction. The odds of thinking 
that other team members would feel that awarding a bonus was not 
inappropriate were 4.0 times greater when interest was present 
than when it was not present. In the absence of interest, the 
odds of thinking that other team members would feel that awarding 
a bonus was not inappropriate were 10.2 times greater when 
legitimacy was present than when it was absent. We found no 
effect of legitimacy in the presence of interest. Although we 
found no effect of interest on the subject's assumptions about 
the other team members’ approval of the network, we again found a
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large difference in the effects of legitimacy under different 
conditions of interest. In the presence of interest, legitimacy 
has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the log~odds of 
thinking that others approve of the network. In the absence of 
interest, on the other hand, legitimacy has a strong positive 
effect; the odds of thinking that others would approve of the 
network were 5.8 times greater when legitimacy was present than 
when it was absent. (It should be noted that the two strongest 
interaction terms were found in items concerned with attitudes of 
others.)
v. Discussion.
The Behavior of the Subjects.
The behavioral findings of the experiment depart in two 
significant ways from Bachrach and Baratz’s model. First, 
legitimacy has an effect that does not depend on interest.
Second, the correlation between interest and behavior depends on 
the level of legitimacy but the effect of interest is less rather 
than greater when legitimacy is present.
This latter, "interference," effect does not disconfirm 
Bachrach and Baratz’s argument that vested interests have a 
greater effect when they can be legitimated. Rather, it implies 
that the effect is more complicated and does not depend entirely
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on the motives of the individual. The function of legitimacy is 
to provide accounts acceptable to others for one’s behavior. 
Hence, analysis of the process of justification must take into 
account the conditions under which claims are acceptable. Since 
Kant, if not earlier, Western philosophy has held that 
self-serving motives undermine the legitimacy of moral 
justifications. Both Hollander and Ridgeway have reported 
experimental support for the hypothesis that subjects in 
experiments are Kantian (Hollander and Julian, 1970; Ridgeway, 
1982). The effect of a need for acceptability is therefore the 
opposite of the effect that an interest has on motives: The more 
transparent the self-interest of a claim, the less its 
acceptability as a justification. There are therefore two 
countervailing factors at work in the interaction condition of 
the experiment. The existence of a vested interest increases a 
subject’s motivation to justify his behavior by appeal to the 
experimenter’s purposes but it also undermines the acceptability 
of the justification as an account for his behavior. The first 
factor increases the rate at which subjects veto change-oriented 
agendas but the second significantly reduces the magnitude of 
this effect.
Both the independent effect of legitimacy and the
countervailing effect of a need for acceptability lead us to 
reject Bachrach and Baratz's model of agenda gatekeeping. The 
nested interaction model that best represents their 
redistributive hypothesis does not fit the data. The alternative 
nested interaction model that does fit it has both a main effect 
of legitimacy and an interference rather than reinforcement 
interaction, A more parsimonious main effects model also fits 
the data quite adequately (though the fact that the interaction 
term is not significant could be due to a ceiling effect), but it 
is also inconsistent with Bachrach and Baratz because legitimacy 
has an independent effect on b e h a v i o r . 1 2
The Questionnaire Results.
Analysis of the gatekeeper's justifications of his behavior, 
measured by post-session questionnaires, fits Bachrach and 
Baratz’s model better than the behavioral data but the 
interference effect is repeated there too. In the three 
questions about the bonus, interest has a significant main effect 
while legitimacy does not. But in the two questions about the 
opinions of others, there is a statistically significant 
interaction that again implies some 3ort of "interference" when 
legitimacy and interest are combined. And even though the 
interaction terms are not significant in the other three items,
־40־
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the same pattern is found in all five. Thi3 does not rule out 
Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis as conclusively as the 
interference effect in the behavioral data because one could 
argue that in the case of post-session questionnaire data the 
experimenter's instructions already justify the subject.s 
behavior, which reduces the need for ideological work. Hence, 
there is less pressure to "approve" the structure and bonus in 
the IL condition. But the questionnaire data do rule out the 
possibility that a main effects with interaction model was 
rejected only because of a ceiling effect. It is consistent with 
the interference hypothesis. It is suggestive that the strongest 
interference effect is found in attributions of attitudes to 
others, tending to support the "need for acceptability" argument. 
And the "need for ideology" argument does not explain the 
behavioral data.
Significance of the Results.
The first conclusion to draw from this experiment is that 
legitimacy i3 not reducible to purely material interest. One 
experiment is not sufficient grounds for rejecting a whole way of 
thought and we did not even try to test the theory of 
norm-formation that is at the heart of this way of thought, but
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we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that an agenda 
gatekeeper*s ,,mobilization of bias" depends on a vested interest. 
The same 1*bias” was mobilized without such an interest and the 
presence of an. interest decreased rather than increased its 
effect.
It would require a whole sea of anomalies to sink a 
theoretical strategy, and we are not trying to argue that we have 
empirically tested and disconfirraed economism. What we are 
arguing is that instrumental Marxism has conceptualized the world 
in a way that has no place for our findings and is therefore not 
very useful. The dichotomy between base and super-structure and 
the monocausal, one-way relation between them on which economism 
is built is impossible to maintain: The base is a mix of 
elements some of which are material (tools), some not (property 
relations); the superstructure is a mix of elements (values, 
rules, empirical beliefs, nonempirical beliefs) with several 
different kinds of (causal) relations to the base. The findings 
of our experiment have no systematic place in instrumental 
Marxism; they can be treated by it only as uncorrelated error, 
and therefore only as a residual class of undifferentiated 
factors necessarily left unanalyzed by it.
A second conclusion to draw from the experiment is that the
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"mobilization of bias” does not depend on its instrumental 
manipulation by agents of the ruling class. It has always been 
an embarrassment of instrumental Marxism's that A behaves more 
rationally than B, that A’s behavior requires a different 
explanation than B*3.13 in the present experiment, A is like B 
bound by the rules, is about equally nonrational, and as 
reluctant to make or invoke rules arbitrarily. It is useful to 
compare the results with those of a companion experiment (Thoma3, 
et al, 1984) in which the same amount is at stake, the same 
methods are used to make the communication network valid, but the 
subjects are located in the peripheral positions of the 
communication network. In the control condition, 80% of subjects 
made change-responses. Under conditions that correspond to the 
interaction condition of the present experiment, only 30% made 
change-responses. This implies that under open interaction 
conditions, the sheer existance of a normative order would have 
suppressed the issue 70% of tne time; we would have observed 
redistributive issues (.15 x .30) = 4.5% of the time; and an 
agenda gatekeeper would have suppressed the issue only (.85 x 
•30) = 25.5% of the time. Under similar conditions, Zelditch and 
Ford (1984) found that the sheer existence of a power structure 
had the same effect: Potential power at the center suppressed
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redistributive issues without any overt threats or promises by A. 
In both experiments the rate of nondecisionmaking was high, but 
in neither did it depend on motivated, specific acts by agenda 
gatekeepers. It depended only on the sheer existence of 
normative frameworks and power structures. Instrumentalism thus 
creates for instrumental Marxism the same problems as economism: 
It robs the strategy of tools for analyzing how such ,,structural" 
effects come about.
Not ail Marxisms make the assumptions we have just rejected: 
Many Marxists as well as anti-Marxists have rejected them as 
vulgar, even unMarxist1  ^ from the start, including: the 
refutation of economism by Hegelianizing Marxisms (Korsch, 
Lukács), the even more thorough-going rejection of 
instrumentalism as well as economism by Horkheimer and Gramsci 
(whose rejection of vulgar Marxism goes so far that he is hardly 
distinguishable from Parsons), but especially post-war 
neo-Marxisms which have been most self-conscious about it. 
Hegelianism has flowered in post-war critical theory, especially 
in Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. Offe is quite forthright in 
his rejection of instrumentalism (nicely expressed in Offe and 
Range, 1975.) Equally important has been the emphasis by Marxist 
structuralism on the autonomy of the state (as in Poulantsas,
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1973), and the importance, even independence, of ideology (the 
former in Althusser, 1971, the latter in Therborn, 1980). We are 
not ourselves Marxists and are not trying to make positive claims 
in favor of any or all these neo-Marxisms; we merely point out 
that our results do not touch all kinds of Marxism. We might 
have said more had we been able to definitively identify the best 
alternative to Bachrach and Baratz’s model. But the only 
conclusion of which we are sure is that a nested interaction 
model with a main effect for interests and an interaction in 
which legitimacy reinforces interest does not fit the data. A 
better nested interaction model is one with a main effect for 
legitimacy and an interaction in which interests interfere with 
it. But we cannot decisively rule out a main effects model or 
even a main effects model with a positive interaction, both of 
which are as consistent with most neo-Marxisms as with 
anti-Marxism.
What does emerge from the experiment is a conception of the 
”mobilization of bias” in which agenda gatekeepers act to 
maintain a normative order whether interested or not and the 
existence of a normative order causes nondecisions whether agenda 
gatekeepers act to maintain it or not. It is not that interests 
play no role in the process, but the mobilization of bias is the
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outcome, not of the rational acts of concrete interests, but of 
the way social systems are organized.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In sociology, one can count Vidich and Bensraan’s analysis of 
small town politics as a precursor of Bachrach and Baratz; 
Molotch'3 analysis of the Santa Barbara oil spill as a direct 
outgrowth of it; and Moore's historical study of German 
unrevolutionary politics as certainly influenced by it. (See 
Vidich and Bensman, 1958; Molotch, 1970; Moore, 1978.) Lukes 
founded his "radical," ,,three-dimensional" theory of power on 
Bachrach and Baratz and Gaventa’3 prize-winning field study of 
unprotest in Appalachia was based on this reformulation. (Lukes, 
1975; Gaventa, 1980.) Finally, Smith's brilliant study of 
differences between the decision and predecision politics of 
fluoridation, although from a wholly different (ecological) 
perspective, was certainly rooted in Bachrach and Baratz.
(Smith, 1979). In political science, agenda research exploded 
after Bachrach and Baratz, but little of this research was 
concerned, as they were, with the politics of the suppression of 
issues. (For summary reviews see Cobb and Elder, 1972; Mansbach 
and Vasquez, 1981.) The most important exception was Crenson's 
study of the unpolitics of air pollution (Crenson, 1971), but its 
fate has been typical of research on "nondecisions": It
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disappeared in a maze of methodological critiques (such as 
Polsby, 1980, Ch. 11). "Nondecisionmaking" proper is a subject 
made up largely of programatic virtues (such as in Baratz, 1977) 
and metamethodological vices (summarized in Zelditch, et al,
1983, PP. 9-10.)
2. For comments on the costs to external validity, see 
Zelditch, et al, 1983, РР* 19-21 and Zelditch and Ford, 1984, pp. 
37-39.
3. See Ford, 1981; Lineweber, Barr-Bryan, and Zelditch, 1982; 
Thomas, et al, 1984; Walker, et al, 1982; Zelditch and Ford,
1984; and a review of these studies by Zelditch, et al, 1983•
4. This model does not imply that A has no effect on В if A 
does not mobilize bias. Bachrach and Baratz’s theory in fact 
implies that the power and legitimacy of A and the powerlessness 
and illegitimacy of В have effects on В even if A does nothing 
and even if A does not intend any such effects. See Zelditch, et 
al, 1983 for a brief review of various studies of the behavior of
B, and bibliography cited in note 3 for details.
5. Bachrach and Baratz do not assume the more extreme thesis 
that pure power suffices to make a rule. Although the ghost of 
Thrasymachus haunts their theory, they tacitly assume that it is 
logically impossible for pure power to make a rule because a
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rule requires acceptance, not merely compliance. In their 
theory, it is authority that makes a rule. But it is 
nevertheless possible to assume, as they do, that authority can 
make rules arbitrarily, i.e., entirely instrumentally, and 
entirely with reference to self-interest, without regard either 
for prior consensus or the existing values of B. Hence, the 
implication that A himself is free of the rules.
6. Subjects were excluded from the analysis for the following 
reasons: Four subjects were suspicious, doubting the presence of 
any other participants; eleven subjects failed to understand 
experimental procedures; eighteen subjects failed to recognize 
the inequity of the Bavelas structure; four subjects failed to 
understand the authorization manipulation; one subject exhibited 
an individualistic response (redistributing the bonus); and one 
subject was excluded because of a procedural misunderstanding.
7. The decision to observe subjects in the office position, 
rather than in the center of the communication structure, was 
motivated by at .least two considerations: The nature of the 
experimental procedures did not provide any way to vary the 
interest of the central position, and it was expected that 
placing subjects in the office position would reduce the 
possibility of individualistic redistributions of the bonus
־90-
(i.e., privately negotiated changes that avoided collective 
decision).
8. This variant of the formula for the transformation of logit 
coefficients is appropriate for our data because both of the 
independent variables are dichotomous and because the data are 
effect-coded. Under effect coding, coefficients represent 
comparisons with the unweighted mean. For dichotomous variables, 
tne coefficient for the omitted category of a variable is equal 
to the negative of the coefficient for the included category.
The contrast between categories of the independent variable is 
represented by the difference between the coefficients, or two 
times the coefficient for the included category.
9. The predicted logit for the main effects model with both 
interest and legitimacy present is *J.27, which corresponds to a 
predicted probability of vetoing of .81. A hypothetical logit 
analysis with only one subject in the interaction condition 
endorsing the rental request did not produce a significant 
interaction term.
10. Collapsing of categories was necessary not only to make the 
logit analysis easier to enterpret, but also because of small 
sample sizes.
-Si­
11. We also found that in no case was there a significant 
interaction terra when estimating a model of two main effects with 
interaction. This result is helpful in interpreting the 
behavioral data because there is little reason to suspect a 
ceiling effect in the questionnaire data. The number of subjects 
available to estimate a reinforcement effect in the IL cell 
ranged from 30% to 80%, averaging 54%. Thus, it did not require 
perfection to achieve a reinforcement effect. In the two items 
with a significant (negative) interaction, 60% in one and 80% in 
the other could still have changed before reaching 100%.
12. A simple way to save Bachrach and Baratz's argument would be 
to claim that the best model is a main effects model with a 
positive interaction but that the interaction is insignificant 
because of a ceiling effect and the effect of legitimacy is 
really the effect of power. This is not a very compelling 
argument because there is no ceiling effect in the questionnaire 
data and, by design, very little power in the experiment. The 
experimenter has no direct or indirect effect on the subjects’ 
academic standing; their material rewards in the experiment are 
unconditional; and they may be apprehensive about the
experimenter’s evaluations of them but he never once appears in 
person in the experiment. (The distance between experimenter and
subject was modeled on Milgram’s finding that distant 
experimenters have markedly less effect on subjects; see 1974, 
pp. 59-62. We may be wrong in thinking that the effect of 
legitimacy is a demand characteristics effect, i.e., an effect of 
the subjects' knowledge of the experimenter’s objectives and of 
what it means to do an experiment. But even if one argues that 
the effect is due to the experimenter״s explicit directives, it 
is authority, not power, voluntary, not involuntary compliance, 
that explains it and therefore still legitimacy, not power.
13• In Marx, of course, it was the bourgeoisie, not the 
proletariat, that was falsely conscious (although he never used 
the term) and the two were equally rational.
14. Instrumentalism is inconsistent with an emphasis on ,,the 
totality," i.e., with Marxist holism. It is about rational, 
self-interested motives for specific, individual acts. But Marx 
and Engels were more often concerned with macro than micro 
phenomena, with large-scale transformations of society, its major 
institutional features, and mass phenomena not consciously 
willed, not specific acts. When Marx and Engels did explain 
ideas (such as equality, liberty, or contract) by their relation 
to the base, they were more likely to explain them in terms of 
the functional requirements of capitalism than self-serving
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defense of ruling class interests. (Cf Marx on the Jewish 
question.) This does not mean that vulgar Marxism is not Marx 
and was only a later invention (either by Engels or someone 
else). Gouldner (1980) and Timpanaro (1975) are probably right 
that both Marx and Engels were internally inconsistent and that 
it is wrong, if fashionable, to blame Engel3 for a vulgarism Marx 
never shared. But the instrumentalism of a more vulgar Marxism 
is inconsistent with the holism of a less vulgar Marxism and in 
that sense Marxists who reject it as unMarxi3t are right.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF QUESTIONS EMPLOYED IN SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES
A. Based on your experience would you approve or disapprove of 
this communication system? Circle the point on the scale which 
best represents your feelings.
'highly
disapprove
5
DISAPPROVE 
slightly 
disapprove 
4
neither approve 
nor disapprove 
3
APPROVE
slightly
approve
2
highly
approve
1
B. In general do you believe other team members approve or 
disapprove of this communication system? Circle the point on the 
scale which best represents your feelings.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
highly slightly neither approve slightly highly
approve approve nor disapprove disapprove disapprove 
1 2  3 4 5
C. In general how do you feel about the amount of the bonus 
payment? Circle the point on the scale which best represents 
your feelings about the bonus payment.
much too low too low about right too high much too high
1 2  3 4 5
D. How appropriate do you believe it is to award a bonus to the 
first team member who submits the correct answer? Circle the 
point on the scale which best represents your feelings.
APPROPRIATE INAPPROPRIATE
very somewhat not appropriate somewhat very
or inappropriate
1 2 3 4 5
E. In general how appropriate do you believe other team members 
would feel it is to award a bonus payment to the first team 
member who submits the correct answer? Circle the point on the 
scale which best represents your beliefs about their feelings.
APPROPRIATE INAPPROPRIATE
very somewhat not appropriate somewhat very
or inappropriate
1 2 3 4 5
